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11 Introduction
Economic globalisation has had a particular profound impact upon ﬁnancial development
during the last four decades giving rise to a group of closely intertwined international mar-
kets on which banks, corporations, or government agencies trade an increasing amount of
assets such as bonds, shares, or currencies. The transaction cost of accessing external funds
has shrunk considerably, which facilitates investment and market entry, entails competi-
tive pressures to innovate, mobilises savings to accumulate capital, and eventually induces
further economic growth (Levine 1997, 2005). Still, in terms of ﬁnancial development, con-
siderable heterogeneity continues to exist around the world. While in the period 1990-1999
total capitalisation of stock markets in Hong Kong, Malaysia, or Luxembourg exceeded 100
per cent of GDP, many developing countries did not provide ﬁrms the possibility of gaining
access to equity ﬁnance by selling shares. Moreover, even within the OECD, during the
same period, the largest credit markets such as those of Japan or Switzerland granted about
ten times more funds to their private sector than the least ﬁnancially developed member
states e.g. Turkey or Poland.
Given the nexus between ﬁnancial and economic development as well as the relatively
high international capital mobility, it is prima facie not clear why such diﬀerences in the size
of ﬁnancial markets persist. To date, three broad theories have been proposed to explain
the absence of ﬁnancial development in some countries amid the ongoing globalisation.
First, according to Stulz and Williamson (2003), cultural heritage may preserve a shared
set of widely self-perpetuating values and beliefs even when these are highly deterrent to
ﬁnancial intermediation. Religions in particular impose numerous rules of moral conduct on
matters such as the seeking of enrichment, (illegitimate) ﬁnancial practices such as usury,
or may even prohibit charging interest rates. Thereby, most religions seem to attach more
weight to the rights of debtors than those of creditors.
Secondly, institutional theories point out that upholding and credibly enforcing property
rights - e.g. the right of property owners to extract returns on investment - stands crucial
in conducting ﬁnancial transactions since potential ﬁnanciers will be reluctant to surrender
funds in the face of risks of being expropriated. Thereby, according to the law and ﬁnance
theory of La Porta et al. (1997), legal systems diﬀer systematically in proliferating property
rights. The common law evolved in 17th century England in order to protect property
owners from being dispossessed by the Crown, which gave rise to relatively good investor
protection. Conversely, instead of protecting private contracts and property rights, the
2development of French civil law rested on the desire to solidify state power by giving the
government the right to centrally enact statutes. Despite attempts to eliminate the role of
corrupt courts, centralising the legal system resulted instead in increased incentives to abuse
public power for private beneﬁt (Beck et al. 2003). Thus, legal origin matters against the
background that ﬁnanciers require, as a last resort, some third party like the court system to
prevent entrepreneurs from deferring repayments. However, enforcing arm’s-length contracts
necessitates the delegation of discretionary power to some authority, which always opens
up opportunities for predatory behaviour when bureaucrats, judges, or politicians infringe
property rights in order to pocket rents accruing from ﬁnancial transactions and development
(Acemoglu and Johnson 2005).
Finally, when adopting a political economy perspective, establishing open and transpar-
ent ﬁnancial markets might not always serve the interest of the political and economic elite.
In particular, Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue that while developed stock markets and
banking systems enhance economic wealth in general, they initiate competition and may
therefore run contrary to the private interests of powerful groups. In countries sheltered
from foreign competition, elites with access to government power and economic rents may
indeed have considerable incentives to keep tight control of ﬁnancial transactions in order
to prevent new enterprises from entering the domestic market. Conversely, in countries that
are open to international goods trade and well integrated into the global economy, domestic
rents are likely to be competed down by foreign ﬁrms regardless the eﬃciency of domestic
capital markets. Indeed, Ades and Di Tella (1999) ﬁnd corruption, as a particular form of
rent-seeking, to be more endemic in countries with modest exports and imports relative to
the size of their economy.
Hitherto, empirical studies have assessed the determinants of ﬁnancial development sep-
arately against the background of individual theories.
As regards cultural determinants, Stulz and Williamson (2003) suggest that the principal
monotheistic religions such as Catholicism, Islam, and Protestantism relate systematically
to the establishment and enforcement of creditors’ rights and therefore aﬀect the eﬃciency
of capital markets.
La Porta et al. (1997) and Beck et al. (2003) observe that common and civil law systems
were spread by means of colonial rule as well as the Napoleonic conquests in the aftermath of
3the French revolution.1 This allows to relate the relatively limited capital markets in French
civil law countries directly to legal origin, which causes poor investor protection, without
risking that the causality runs from ﬁnancial underdevelopment undermining investor pro-
tection and legal eﬃciency instead.
Stressing the importance of institutionalised constraints preventing predatory governance
rather than the contractual, or legal dimension, Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) attribute the
diﬀerences across countries’ ﬁnancial development to the colonial strategy of European em-
pires, which largely depended on the disease environment encountered by European settlers.
In places with relatively modest health hazards for settlement, colonial powers devised in-
stitutions that were similar to those of the home country preventing e.g. the government
from having access to excessive levels of power. By comparison, territories too hostile for
settlement served merely for extracting resources, and institutions were put in place to max-
imise state income rather than to promote good governance. In former colonies, both the
origin of legal institutions, e.g. which power colonised a territory, and institutions to prevent
predatory governance, e.g. for what purpose was a territory colonised for according to the
disease environment, continue to determine the size of capital markets (Beck et al. 2003).
However, constraining government power seems to matter more when explaining ﬁnancial
development (Acemoglu and Johnson 2005).
Finally, in the empirical part of their studies, Rajan and Zingales (2003) as well as Huang
and Temple (2005) ﬁnd the expected positive relationship between trade openness and ﬁnan-
cial development, at least in countries open to capital ﬂows, which provides some support
for the interest group theory of ﬁnancial development. However, trade openness might af-
fect ﬁnancial development through channels other than easing the opposition of incumbent
political and economic elites. For example, Do and Levchenko (2006) argue that in coun-
tries abundantly endowed with physical capital, specialisation in capital-intensive industries
increases the demand for well functioning ﬁnancial intermediation.
The contribution of the present paper lies in conducting an integrated test on the ability
of cultural beliefs and values, institutional quality, and trade to explain cross-country dif-
ferences in ﬁnancial development. To avoid our results being aﬀected by regional ﬁnancial
downturns such as the Asian crises in 1997, we employ data on stock market capitalisation
and the amount of credit granted to the private sector averaged over the 1990s to measure the
1The overlap between colonial and legal origin is close but not perfect. E.g. despite a British colonial
heritage, Jordan, Egypt, Iraq, Malta, and Mauritius adopted civil law systems.
4size of capital markets. Further pitfalls arise from the interdependence between trade and
ﬁnance (Svaleryd and Vlachos 2002) and institutions and ﬁnance, which necessitates draw-
ing up an econometric system embedded in exogenous variables including colonial history,
culture, and geography. For the period under consideration, these instrumental variables
can be considered as predetermined, e.g. they may serve as sources of exogenous variation
uncorrelated with stochastic components of endogenous ﬁnancial, institutional, and trade
variables, allowing to estimate ﬁnancial development by means of two-stage least squares.
The results suggest that trade openness and institutions hindering elites from amassing
rents by infringing property rights of investors provide the basis to set oﬀ ﬁnancial develop-
ment. Conversely, there is limited support for the hypothesis that cultural beliefs associated
with religious aﬃliation, and burdensome procedures for enforcing contracts rooted in legal
heritage, exhibit a direct and determining impact upon the size of capital markets.
The remainder is organised as follows: section 2 draws together the interrelationships
between ﬁnancial development and its determinants into an econometric model meanwhile
section 3 prepares the stage further by discussing instrumental variables predicting institu-
tional quality and trade openness. Section 4 assembles exogenous and predicted variables
pertaining to culture, institutions, and trade to assess their explanatory power on ﬁnancial
development. Section 5 summarises and concludes.
2 An Econometric System for the Determinants of Fi-
nancial Development
From the 1960s onwards, many countries around the world have witnessed a gradual rise in
the size, breadth, and valuation of their capital markets (Rajan and Zingales 2003), which
has coincided with a further deepening of international economic integration and eﬀorts
to spread institutions to enhance the quality of government. Thus, well functioning capi-
tal markets, institutional quality, and trade openness might be determined simultaneously
within a system of structural equations rather than exhibiting unilateral, eﬀect-cause re-
lationships. The path diagram of ﬁgure 1 attempts to summarise the interrelationships
between exogenous and endogenous variables that feature in the theoretical literature on
ﬁnancial development.2
2A similar diagram explaining income levels appears in Rodrik et al. (2004).
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The direct determinants of ﬁnancial development, designated by solid arrows, have been
discussed during the outset. To recapitulate, a shift from small-scale personal to complex
impersonal ﬁnancial exchanges requires institutions (INS) such as the rule of law or political
checks and balances that protect intermediaries from expropriation e.g. when debtors breach
contracts or a leviathan political elite interferes with ﬁnancial transactions to seek self-
enrichment (path A). Economic integration provides an alternative way of mitigating against
opportunistic behaviour, since trade openness (TRD) tends to erode rents and undermine
the political opposition of incumbents to ﬁnancial development (B). Further, culture (CUL)
directly aﬀects the establishment of capital markets insofar as attitudes are promoted that
reduce uncertainties within ﬁnancial transactions or beliefs are held that sacriﬁce creditors’
or debtors’ rights on the altar of religions tenets (C).
Some of the determinants of ﬁnancial development in ﬁgure 1 constitute endogenous
variables, which are designated by unshaded boxes, to the extent that they are themselves
re-aﬀected by established capital markets or depend on some third variable. For example,
institutional quality by deﬁnition manifests in lower transaction costs (North 1990: Chapter
4), which in turn fosters international trade (D) therefore exhibiting an indirect eﬀect onto
the size of capital markets. Then again, open markets could not only deliver foreign goods
but likewise reversely cause sound institutions, e.g. when new ideas travel along trading
routes (E). A similar reverse causality as regards the interest group theory occurs when broad
capital markets facilitate the access to external funds of both domestic and international
entrepreneurs and thereby feed back upon international trade (F). In particular, Feeney and
Hillman (2004) as well as Svaleryd and Vlachos (2002) point out that capital markets serve
to diversify risk and thus may act as complement for protectionist impediments to trade
intended to insure domestic markets against shocks originating in the global economy.
Turning towards sources of exogenous variation (designated by shaded boxes) upon which
no other variable impacts, culture (CUL) may aﬀect the establishment of capital markets
indirectly by enhancing institutional quality (G). According to La Porta et al. (1999),
religions such as Catholicism and Islam with a rather centralised interpretation of faith,
rely on a hierarchically structured organisation to solidify spiritual power, which breeds
intolerance towards modernisation, reduces the quality of government, and tends to retard
economic development (see also Landes 1998: Chapters 11, 24).
Other exogenous factors impacting indirectly upon ﬁnancial development include colonial
history (HIS) and geography (GEO).
6Legal and political institutions safeguarding ﬁnancial transactions have historically been
spread through conquest (H). Since institutions typically change only gradually over time
(North 1990), the eﬀect of exogenously imposed institutions potentially endures long after
the control of an occupying or colonial power has ceased.
Despite steady decreases in transportation costs, trade continues to be in essence a neigh-
bourhood phenomenon related to geographical factors (I). This ﬁnding has been exploited
by Frankel and Romer (1999) who construct trade shares from a gravity equation regressing
bilateral exchanges onto distance, country size, and other geographical variables. Finally,
relating institutional quality to geographical factors (J) rests on the striking fact that most
(ﬁnancially) underdeveloped countries are located within the tropics and subtropics rather
than in temperate areas. However, we are not aware of any theory linking ﬁnancial de-
velopment directly to climatic or ecological conditions. Rather, climate zones, proxied by
e.g. a country’s latitude, reﬂect the disease environment encountered during colonial set-
tlement, which determined the incentives to create extractive institutions (Acemoglu and
Johnson 2005), or aﬀect agricultural productivity and in turn the proportion of the labour
force potentially available for industrial production. Despite substantial research eﬀorts, the
importance of geography as a determinant of a country’s development remains controversial
(among others, Gallup et al. 1999; Landes 1998: Chapters 1,2; Rodrik et al. 2004; Sachs
2003). In particular, the exact path through which a measure like latitude ends up aﬀecting
ﬁnancial development is far from clear. Therefore, we employ geographical latitude as a
broad control for economic, institutional, and historical conditions and will assess its impact
carefully meanwhile conducting robustness checks.
The relationships of ﬁgure 1 can be restated in form of structural equations for each
endogenous variable. In particular, econometric equations associate ﬁnancial development,
α11FIN + α12INS + α13TRD + β11CUL = c1 + 1 (1)
institutional quality,
α22INS + α23TRD + β21CUL + β22GEO + β23HIS = c2 + 2 (2)
and trade openness,
α31FIN + α32INS + α33TRD + β32GEO = c3 + 3 (3)
7with exogenous variables (CUL, GEO, HIS), whose coeﬃcients are designated by βij with
subscripts ij referring to equations respectively variables, endogenous variables, whose coef-
ﬁcients are designated by αij, stochastic disturbances i, and an intercept term ci. In order
not to risk simultaneous equations bias, ﬁnancial development (1) needs estimating jointly
with (2) and (3) within the structural system,
y0A + z0B = c0 + 0 (4)
where y is a 1×3 vector collecting endogenous variables (FIN,INS,TRD) whilst the 1×3
vector z collects the set of exogenous, or instrumental variables (CUL,GEO,HIS). Matrices
A and B contain the structural coeﬃcients, some of which can, however, not be retrieved
from (4) since endogenous variables, y, aﬀected by reverse causality remain unobservable.
Instead, institutional quality ( d INS) and trade openness ( d TRD) can be predicted by means
of a two stage-stage least squares procedure (2SLS), which, after transforming (4) into its
reduced form,
y0 = c0A−1 − z0BA−1 + 0A−1 (5)
regresses endogenous variables ﬁrst onto underlying instrumental variables. To the extent
that the ﬁtted values ( d INS) and ( d TRD) are highly correlated with their actual counterparts,
they serve as good proxies to establish the causal impact of institutional quality and trade
openness upon ﬁnancial development during the second stage.
3 Instrumental Variables predicting Institutional Qual-
ity and Trade
To prepare the ground for establishing the determinants of ﬁnancial development, this section
extracts the predicted variables for institutional quality and trade openness from ﬁrst-stage
regressions onto underlying instrumental variables within the reduced form (5). We focus
on parsimonious models including a small number of exogenous variables, which exhibit a
strong and theoretically underpinned correlation with institutional quality and trade since
instruments with coeﬃcients close to zero, e.g. weak instruments, might harm the eﬃciency
of subsequent estimates (Staiger and Stock 1997). Unlike other direct determinants of
ﬁnancial development, culture encompasses exogenous variables and therefore does not need
to be instrumented for in a ﬁrst stage.
83.1 Institutional Quality
Institutional quality manifests within ﬁnancial exchanges in the degree to which humanly
devised rules lead to the proliferation of investor protection and facilitate the access of
entrepreneurs to external funds. In arm’s-length ﬁnancial transactions, the prospect for
enforcing ﬁnancial contracts depends in turn on the willingness of the state to protect in-
vestors from being dispossessed. However, the state itself may infringe property rights when
politicians or bureaucrats abuse their discretion in order to seek self-enrichment inducing
arbitrariness based uncertainty, which undermines the trust in arm’s-length transactions.
North (1981) addresses the irony of contracting parties relying on the state to protect
ﬁnancial transactions and the risk that a political elite supposed to govern ﬁnancial mar-
kets will extract ﬁnancial resources instead, by distinguishing a contracting and predatory
dimension of institutional quality. Under the contracting view, ﬁnanciers and entrepreneurs
are thought to enter voluntary agreements, e.g. on respecting prespeciﬁed property rights,
constraining the potential activities inter se to facilitate ﬁnancial transactions in a mutually
beneﬁcial manner. Likewise, state organisations devised to monitor and enforce property
rights constitute the product of mutual consent. Conversely, under the predatory view
the state is perceived as an agency receiving ﬁscal revenue from ﬁnanciers/entreprenuers in
exchange for granting and safeguarding property rights. Then, institutional quality mani-
fests in the degree to which the rule of law and checks and balances constrain the political
elite from pursuing their self-interest by manipulating creditors’ and debtors’ rights, thus
undermining secure ﬁnancial transactions.
Following Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), an index on LEGAL FORMALISM involved
in collecting a bounced cheque, which assigns scores to countries from 1 (least cumbersome
procedures) to 7 (most cumbersome procedures), measures the quality of contracting insti-
tutions. Conversely, predatory institutions are reﬂected by the CONSTRAINTS ON THE
EXECUTIVE as measured by a seven category scale index averaged over the 1990s with
higher values designating more constraints.3 Note that an increase in LEGAL FORMALISM
translates into a decrease in institutional quality whereas the opposite relationship holds for
CONSTRAINTS ON THE EXECUTIVE.
Table 3 reports the estimated impact of various historical, cultural, and geographical
instruments upon institutional quality; table 1 of the appendix provides exact deﬁnitions
3Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) label the ”vertical” or state-entreprenuer/ﬁnancier dimension as ”property
rights” rather than ”predatory” institutions.
9and sources of all variables. Throughout the remainder, variables have been standardised
to enable a direct comparison between the magnitude of estimated coeﬃcients.4
Table 3 about here
Institutions change only incrementally like society itself wherefore their origin matters.
For example, colonial history left a deep imprint on the establishment of legal and political
institutions as well as on the religious and linguistic environment in countries formerly
controlled by European empires.
In particular, column (1) shows that COMMON LAW heritage tends to signiﬁcantly
reduce LEGAL FORMALISM thus enhancing contracting institutions, which coincides with
the ﬁndings of Djankov et al. (2002) in their cross-country study on the cost involved in
setting up a ﬁrm. COMMON LAW evolves around the resolution of disputes by the courts
and is only subsequently enacted into legal principles. The absence of an encompassing
legal codiﬁcation could provide judges with the ﬂexibility to focus on the resolution of legal
conﬂicts without having to comply with strict dogmas or potentially burdensome procedural
rules. Conversely, the civil law relies on a collection of centrally enacted and authoritative
legal principles, which leave judges with less discretion to resolve disputes on a case-by-
case basis. Albeit this mitigates against abuses by corrupt judges (which was the basic
rationale for designing the French civil law) a comprehensive codiﬁcation allegedly induces
more cumbersome procedures and hence increases the cost of enforcing a contract.
As regards predatory institutions, the fraction of the population having a major EURO-
PEAN LANGUAGE as the mother tongue has been taken from Hall and Jones (1999) to
instrument for the credible enforcement of property rights. Institutions, such as democracy,
checks and balances, or the rule of law guarding against usurpatory state power originated
in Western Europe and were spread during the colonial era. Therefore, the aﬃliation with
these institutions relates systematically to the inﬂuence colonial powers exerted over a ter-
ritory, which could be preserved in present-day linguistic conditions. Estimates of column
(2) indeed ﬁnd a strong positive relationship between the extent to which EUROPEAN
LANGUAGES are spoken and the degree to which a country puts CONSTRAINTS ON
THE EXECUTIVE e.g. to prevent investors from being dispossessed. The mortality rates
of European settlers before 1850 provide another way to trace the inﬂuence of colonial pow-
ers and the corresponding spread of institutions mitigating against predatory governance.
Despite only relating to former colonies reducing the sample by almost 50 countries, settler
4E.g. coeﬃcients designate the conditional impact of a change of one standard deviation upon the change
of the standardised dependent variable.
10MORTALITY rates enter the regressions of column (3) signiﬁcantly with the expected neg-
ative sign. However, under the joint inclusion with EUROPEAN LANGUAGES in column
(4) the coeﬃcient on settler MORTALITY is only marginally signiﬁcant possibly due to
multicollinearity.
Religious aﬃliation and ethnic diversity constitute two broad measures of cultural dif-
ferences across countries.
Stulz and Williamson (2003) introduce religious aﬃliation5 to explain diﬀerences in in-
vestor protection arguing that - compared with Protestantism which allows for multiple,
competing churches - Catholic and Muslim belief systems rely more on centrally organised
hierarchies entailing wider consequences for the quality of government when institutionalised
into other areas of society.6 Firstly, the proportion of CATHOLIC believers of a country’s
population seems to induce a weaker protection of creditors’ rights and increase the legal
formalities to enforce contracts. This may be attributed to the close association between
state and church in some Catholic countries, where bureaucracies originated in religious
ranks adopting the hierarchical structure of the Catholic church. Furthermore, Beck et
al. (2003) ﬁnd that in French civil law countries a large share of the population aﬃliates
with Catholicism implying that the positive entry of CATHOLIC might partly reﬂect le-
gal heritage. Secondly, a centralised interpretation of faith runs contrary to empowering
individuals to adopt an attitude of self-responsibility and to question religious authority.
Owing to powerful bonds between state and religion that are not congenial to developing
institutions to hold elites accountable for the absence of e.g. ﬁnancial development, column
(2) of table 3 suggests that MUSLIM countries in particular tend to place only modest
CONSTRAINTS ON THE EXECUTIVE. This coincides with the ﬁnding of La Porta et al.
(1999) that countries with a large proportion of MUSLIMS tend to suﬀer from a low quality
of government.7
Easterly and Levine (1997), La Porta et al. (1999), and Alesina et al. (2003) suggest
ETHNIC DIVERSITY to impact negatively upon institutional quality since polarised soci-
5Unlike Stulz and Williamson (2003), this study follows La Porta et al. (1999) and Beck et al. (2003)
by measuring the impact of religions by the proportion of the population aﬃliated to a belief system rather
than indicating the predominant religion. Employing alternative measures of religious aﬃliation however
did not aﬀect the essence of the aftermentioned results.
6For a recent empirical study see La Porta et al. (1999). Landes (1998) provides an economic history
perspective on how values and beliefs inherent in religions aﬀect the wealth of nations.
7Neither PROTESTANT and MUSLIM nor PROTESTANT and CATHOLIC impact upon LEGAL FOR-
MALISM respectively the CONSTRAINTS ON THE EXECUTIVE in a signiﬁcant manner. Therefore they
do not enter the current ﬁrst-stage regressions. Including them regardless did not alter the essence of the
aftermentioned results.
11eties might ﬁnd it more diﬃcult to agree on a set of rules to prevent political elites from
having access to an excessive amount of power. Social conﬂicts could even induce ethnic
groups controlling the government to draw up cumbersome legal procedures, which allow to
extract more rents for their coethics along the lines of the tollbooth theory of regulation of
Shleifer and Vishny (1993). However, within our sample of countries, ETHNIC DIVERSITY
results in a signiﬁcant deterioration only of predatory but not contracting institutions.
Finally, a country’s institutional quality increases in its LATITUDE. However, possibly
due to its aforementioned collinearity with settler MORTALITY, the positive entries of LAT-
ITUDE in columns (3) and (4) impact only marginally signiﬁcant upon the CONSTRAINTS
ON THE EXECUTIVE suggesting that the distance from the equator may partly reﬂect
the desire of European colonisers to settle in familiar climatic zones.
To preserve a high number of observations and account for the diversity of countries never
subject to colonial rule, the speciﬁcations of columns (1) and (2) are employed to extract
ﬁtted values on institutional quality ( d INS). Columns (2) and (4) of table 2 of the appendix
report the constructed scores for LEGAL FORMALISM respectively CONSTRAINTS ON
THE EXECUTIVE, which exhibit a correlation of 0.69 and 0.74 with their actual coun-
terparts. Furthermore, the F-statistic of the ﬁrst-stage regressions exceeds the threshold
value of 10 suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997) to uncover weak instruments. Finally, the
pairwise correlation between the ﬁtted values of the ﬁrst-stage regressions ( d INS) is around
-0.14 meaning that contracting and predatory institutions do indeed seem to reﬂect diﬀerent
dimensions of institutional quality.
3.2 Trade Openness
Eﬀorts to adopt an open ﬁnancial system might coincide with policies to remove impediments
to international trade. However, to establish the impact of TRADE OPENNESS, measured
by imports and exports as a share of GDP, a country’s propensity to trade needs establishing
in a ﬁrst-stage from underlying exogenous variables. Thereto, Frankel and Romer (1999)
observe that international trade between countries associates closely with their geographical
proximity and their joint (market) size. To asses the causal impact of economic integra-
tion, we employ CONSTRUCTED TRADE shares taken from Frankel and Rose (2002) and
extracted from a standard gravity equation regressing bilateral trade ﬂows between country-
pairs in 1990 onto the distance between their capital cities, country size in terms of joint
area and the population of the target country, a common language and border indicator, as
12well as whether or not countries are landlocked. Owing to the relationship with exclusively
geographical variables, this oﬀers a measure of the propensity for economic integration that
remains unaﬀected by feed back from e.g. economic or ﬁnancial development.
As can be observed from columns (5) and (6) of table 2, the constructed degree consis-
tently underestimates the actual degree of economic integration. Frankel and Romer (1999:
384-386) attribute this to the fact that gravity equations do not account for the role of
within-country exchanges, which might be of particular importance when domestic markets
are large. Nevertheless, the constructed level of trade openness linearly predicts its actual
counterpart with an F-statistic of 53.86 achieving a correlation of around 0.5, and - in line
with the ﬁndings of Frankel and Romer (1999), Frankel and Rose (2002), or Huang and
Temple (2005) - seems to provide a strong enough instrument to reveal the causal impact
of internationally open goods markets upon ﬁnancial development.
4 Determinants of ﬁnancial development
4.1 Baseline Results
Firms wishing to invest in physical capital, product innovations, or entering new (geograph-
ical) markets can raise external ﬁnance by assuming debt or selling equity. Unfortunately,
comparable measures on the degree to which ﬁnancial intermediaries facilitate the access
to external funds in diﬀerent countries are, to our knowledge, currently unavailable. To
nonetheless establish the causal impact of culture, institutions, and trade upon ﬁnancial
development, we follow Beck et al. (2003) and look at the size of capital markets, which is
supposed to indicate the degree to which they shape up to their expected economic purposes
such as mobilising capital, allocating funds, exerting corporate control, or easing the trade
of goods (see also Levine 1997: 691). Furthermore, countries diﬀer considerably as regards
the relative importance of bank loan and equity ﬁnance. For example, compared with the
US and the UK, companies in Germany and Japan rely more often on banks than stock
markets for ﬁnancial intermediation. Moreover, in developing countries assuming debt is
still the predominant form to access external ﬁnance (La Porta et al. 1997). To account for
the diﬀerent modes of raising funds, two commonly employed measures proxy for ﬁnancial
development (Acemoglu and Johnson 2005; Beck et al. 2003): CREDIT reﬂects the total
amount of ﬁnancial resources that establish a claim for repayment (loans, trade credits, non-
equity securities, etc.) granted to the private sector whereas STOCK measures the market
capitalisation in terms of the total value of shares traded on the domestic stock market.
13To account for economic size and mitigate against ﬂuctuation inherent in ﬁnancial markets,
both variables are expressed in terms of a fraction of GDP and have been averaged over the
years 1990-99. The ﬁnal two columns of table 2 of the appendix list ﬁnancial development
variables.
Table 4 reports the results of regressing variables pertaining to institutional quality,
economic integration, and culture onto CREDIT and STOCK.
Table 4 about here
For reference, columns (1) and (4) report estimates based on the actual rather than
predicted values of respectively institutional quality and trade openness. The diﬀerence
between the coeﬃcients estimated by OLS and two-stage least squares (2SLS) of column
(2) and (5) provides the basis for conducting a Hausman test, which, with a χ2 statistic of
41.85 respectively 179.2, allows indeed rejecting the hypothesis of no correlation between
the errors and regressors at any conventional level.
Stock market development exhibits properties of a censored variable in the sense that
32 countries of our common sample report a value of zero8, e.g. they do not oﬀer ﬁrms the
possibility of selling equity on domestic stock exchanges. To account for the censored distri-
bution, column (3) of table 4 applies Tobit estimates to uncover the eﬀect of instrumental
and exogenous variables onto STOCK and conﬁrm the robustness of the results.
The signiﬁcant coeﬃcients of table 4 widely shape up to theoretical priors and reveal the
following patterns inherent in ﬁnancial development around the world:
First, there is only weak evidence that religious aﬃliation promotes values and beliefs that
directly undermine the development of ﬁnancial markets. Countries with a large MUSLIM
population even seem to allocate relatively more CREDIT to the private sector, which could
be attributed to their generally modest level of economic development making bank lending
the preferred mode of ﬁnance. Conversely, in accordance with the ﬁndings of Stulz and
Williamson (2003) and Beck et al. (2003), CATHOLIC countries seem to have somewhat
narrower capital markets even after controlling for their weaker protection of creditors’ rights
during the ﬁrst stage. However, the eﬀect is only signiﬁcant upon equity ﬁnance. Contrary to
the widely held theory that PROTESTANT tenets (in particular those of Calvinism) such as
predestination, professional success as a divine sign for future salvation, and the prohibition
8Employing standardised values shifts the accumulation of countries from a value of zero towards the
corresponding z-value.
14to live a life in dissipation and luxury foster capital accumulation, present results ﬁnd neither
a signiﬁcant nor a systematic eﬀect on ﬁnancial development.9
Secondly, regardless the estimation method and at any conventional level of rejection,
TRADE OPENNESS tends to enlarge the size of capital markets for both equity and debt
ﬁnance in a statistically signiﬁcant manner. Furthermore, the magnitude of the coeﬃcients
imply that an increase in trade relative to GDP of one standard deviation entails an increase
in ﬁnancial development of between one third and half a standard deviation. The positive
entry of economic integration lends support to the interest group theory of Rajan and
Zingales (2003), e.g. reducing impediments to trade increases the contestability of domestic
markets, reduces monopoly rents, and thereby disciplines domestic elites not to corrupt the
beneﬁts of ﬁnancial development away. However, in countries with comparative advantages
in capital intensive industries, the nexus between the size of ﬁnancial market and economic
integration may also be attributed to an increase in the demand for external funds.
Finally, placing more CONSTRAINTS ON THE EXECUTIVE consistently and signif-
icantly enhances the relative size of capital markets with economically large coeﬃcients
accruing in particular to the amount of CREDIT granted to the private sector. Similarly
to the way which international economic integration competes away monopoly rents, a high
quality of predatory institutions constrains political power that might be abused by the elite
to usurp rents from ﬁnancial transactions. TRADE OPENNESS and the CONSTRAINTS
ON THE EXECUTIVE, hence, may serve the same goal of protecting current and future
investors from being expropriated by a leviathan government emphasising, however, the role
of excessive monopoly rents respectively political power as an obstacle to ﬁnancial devel-
opment. Conversely, contracting institutions inherent in LEGAL FORMALISM exhibit a
far smaller impact upon ﬁnancial development, with rather modest and far from signiﬁcant
coeﬃcients estimated by 2SLS. Therefore, the nexus between investor protection and the
common law seems not to provide the crucial determinant to explain why some countries
remain ﬁnancially underdeveloped. Rather, as suggested by Acemoglu and Johnson (2005),
ﬁnancial markets can work without prominent contracting institutions, albeit, due to the
widely negative entry of LEGAL FORMALISM, an eﬀective enforcement of contracts seems
to facilitate ﬁnancial transactions made at arm’s-length to some extend.
9Easterly and Levine (1997) ﬁnd a positive correlation between ETHNIC and CREDIT. We have not
included ETHNIC as we would expect its eﬀect on ﬁnancial development to occur primarily via the quality
of institutions. Including ETHNIC nevertheless resulted in an insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient which did not aﬀect
the signiﬁcance or direction of impact of the remaining variables.
154.2 Robustness Checks
The accuracy of two-stage least squares estimates rests on the quality of the instrumen-
tal variables employed. Given that the predicted values for institutional quality and trade
openness of table 2 correlate closely with their actual counterparts, and F-statistics of the
ﬁrst-stage regressions exceed the threshold value of 10 proposed by Staiger and Stock (1997),
there is a priori no evidence that the present results suﬀer from weak instruments. However,
the recent literature on economic and ﬁnancial development has given rise to a variety of
alternative historical and geographical variables related to institutional quality and trade
openness, some of which serve in table 5 to run robustness checks on the baseline results.
First-stage results are not reported here as the essence of section 3 carries over when em-
ploying alternative instruments.
Table 5 about here
To mitigate against reverse causality and simultaneous equations bias, Acemoglu and
Johnson (2005) as well as Beck et al. (2003) restrict their sample to ex-colonies. Columns
(1) and (2) of table 5 follow their approach by introducing settler MORTALITY rates
and the POPULATION DENSITY in former colonies to predict the quality of predatory
institutions. To recapitulate, greater health hazards for settlement altered the colonial
strategy insofar as European powers used some territories only to extract resources, which
called for government authority not subject to eﬀective institutional checks and balances.
Likewise, the POPULATION DENSITY in 1500 of column (2) impinges on the colonial
strategy as sparsely populated territories such as Australia, Canada, or New Zealand served
as destinations for a vast number of European emigrants, who installed institutions imposing
constraints on excessive state power similar to those in their countries of origin.
Sachs (2003) has argued that LATITUDE leaves major geographical factors unaccounted
for. In particular, the distance from the equator does not relate to the poor agricultural
productivity of tropical red soils compared with the brown and black soils predominating
in temperate zones, or the vast climatic diﬀerences between countries located on the west-
ern or eastern sides of a continent. Therefore, two alternative instruments for geographical
obstacles to development are employed. Against the background that ﬁnancially and institu-
tionally underdeveloped countries are located predominantly around the equator, column (3)
of table 5 employs the percentage of land located in TROPIC zones and column (4) uses the
proportion of the population living with the risk of contracting MALARIA as geographical
control variable.
16Due to the controversy arising around the exact theoretical underpinning and empirical
direction of the impact of geography upon a country’s development (Gallup et al. 1999;
Sachs 2003; Rodrik et al. 2004), column (5) of table 5 drops LATITUDE altogether from
the set of variables instrumenting for contracting and predatory institutions.
Finally, meanwhile relating TRADE OPENNESS to proximity variables between country
pairs, column (6) of table 5 follows Frankel and Romer (1999: 385), who account for within-
country trade by introducing country size in terms of population and area as additional
instruments to CONSTRUCTED TRADE shares.
Above all, employing alternative sets of instrumental variables to circumvent the endo-
geneity of institutional quality and trade openness lends further support to the previous ﬁnd-
ings that reducing the risk of expropriation within the vertical, state-entrepreneur/ﬁnancier
relationship stands crucial to achieve a high degree of ﬁnancial development. Predatory
institutions and international economic integration fail only to produce a signiﬁcant impact
upon the development of STOCK markets when dropping respectively LATITUDE in col-
umn (5) and accounting for within-country trade in column (6). Meanwhile, the quality
of the legal protection and enforcement of property rights within the horizontal, ﬁnancier-
entrepreneur relationship seems to be beneﬁcial, but not to constitute a prerequisite for
establishing well functioning capital markets. Finally, yet again there is some evidence that
CATHOLIC countries have somewhat smaller capital markets. Moreover MUSLIM belief
relates to the composition of ﬁnancial markets insofar as Islamic countries tend to rely more
on debt ﬁnance.
The ﬁnal two columns of table 5 follow Huang and Temple (2005) to split the sample into
lower and lower-middle income countries as well as high and upper middle-income countries.
This reduces the number of observations and the heterogeneity within the corresponding
subgroup thereby lowering the regression-ﬁt. Investor protection is better proliferated by
high income countries, which - aside from oil-exporting countries - score mostly the max-
imum value of 7 in constraining the state from having access to excessive levels of power.
Conversely, the quality of contracting institutions is less strongly associated with income
levels. With an average value of 3.9, low income countries score only 0.5 points higher
on the extent of LEGAL FORMALISM, which does not translate into signiﬁcantly smaller
capital markets for neither group of countries. Conversely, TRADE OPENNESS continues
to aﬀect ﬁnancial development in a signiﬁcantly positive manner regardless the diﬀerence in
income levels. For low income countries, this concurrence between internationally open mar-
17kets and ﬁnancial development is unlikely to result from an increased demand for ﬁnancial
intermediation by export-orientated industries specialising in capital intensive production,
as proposed by Do and Levchenko (2006). Finally, column (8) of table 5 suggests that the
detrimental impact of CATHOLIC on the size of capital markets arises mainly in high in-
come countries.
Alternative measures have been suggested to proxy for institutional quality. In particular,
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005: 967-975) consider additional indices such as the RISK OF
EXPROPRIATION on foreign direct investments and PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS to
measure the quality of predatory institutions as well as the PROCEDURAL COMPLEXITY
and the NUMBER OF PROCEDURES involved in collecting commercial dept to measure
the quality of contracting institutions.
Table 6 about here
Table 6 reports the results when diﬀerent indices are employed to proxy for the quality
of contracting and predatory institutions. Once again, the essence of our previous results
is conﬁrmed. In particular, mitigating against the risk that elites with access to political
power appropriate rents by expropriating ﬁnanciers increases the willingness for ﬁnancial
intermediaries to surrender funds. However, meanwhile internationally open markets seem
all-important to ﬁnancial development, according to the results of table 6, institutions to
prevent predatory governance seem more important when undertaking equity ﬁnance. More-
over, in contrast to bank-loan ﬁnance, countries dominated by Catholicism tend to have
smaller stock markets. Other religious and contracting institutions seem to exhibit only an
insigniﬁcant direct impact upon ﬁnancial development.
5 Concluding Remarks
By drawing together theories emphasising the role of cultural values and beliefs, dysfunc-
tional institutions, or impediments to trade as obstacles to ﬁnancial development, this paper
has endeavoured to shed more light on the reasons why some countries lack well functioning
capital markets, despite the beneﬁts ﬁnancial markets oﬀer for establishing new enterprises
and fostering economic growth. Two-stage least squares, which estimate the joint eﬀects
of ﬁnancial development, institutional quality, and trade openness, suggest that controlling
the risk that an incumbent elite with access to government power will appropriate rents by
18expropriating investors stands crucial in establishing well functioning ﬁnancial intermedi-
aries. Primarily, leaving domestic markets open to foreign trade and competition, but also
institutions devised to prevent predatory governance - e.g. by strengthening checks and
balances, democratic accountability, or the rule of law - provide mechanisms to undermine
the ability of domestic elites to pocket rents by dispossessing ﬁnanciers. Conversely, con-
tracting institutions seem to be less important insofar as some capital markets apparently
thrive in the absence of safeguarded ﬁnancial contracts between investors and entrepreneurs.
Furthermore, cultural values and beliefs aﬀecting creditors’ and debtors’ rights seem to play
only a minor role in directly determining the size of capital markets. Only Catholic aﬃlia-
tion in high income countries tends to restrain the size of capital markets to some degree.
However, cultural factors such as religion or ethnic diversity aﬀect the quality of predatory
institutions thereby exhibiting an indirect eﬀect onto ﬁnancial development.
Two-stage least squares attribute endogenous variables such as institutional quality or
trade to exogenous factors such as culture, colonial history, or geography before evaluating
their impact upon the size of stock and credit markets. This, however, does not imply that
exogenous factors predetermine ﬁnancial development but merely constitutes a statistical
procedure to oﬀset reverse causality. In particular, diﬀerent countries have pursued diﬀer-
ent strategies relying e.g. more on checks and balances, reducing impediments to trade,
or fostering democratic accountability to prevent rent-seeking governance. However, imple-
menting credible policies to reduce the risk of ﬁnanciers being expropriated by the state
could be highly beneﬁcial when ﬁnancial intermediaries surrender more funds towards new
businesses, which in turn tends to foster economic growth.
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22A Data Appendix
Table 1: Description of the Data Set
This table summarises the data set collected for up to 129 countries as averages over the
1990s unless otherwise stated.
Variable Description Source
CREDIT Financial resources provided to the private sector as a
fraction of GDP. Financial resources include loans, pur-
chases of nonequity securities, trade credits, and other









CATHOLIC Share of the population aﬃliated to Catholicism in 2001. Encyclopedia
Britannica, 2001.
MUSLIM Share of the population aﬃliated to Islam in 2001. Encyclopedia
Britannica, 2001.




ETHNIC Ethnic fractionalisation computed for the years 1965 -
1995 as one minus the Herﬁndahl index of ethnic group
shares (Ethnic = 1 −
P
s
2) reﬂecting the probability






Index of formality in legal procedures for collecting a
bounced cheque in 2004. Index scores range between 1







Index of complexity in collecting commercial debt in
2004. Index scores range from 0 to 10 with higher values













Index on the institutional limitations put on the execu-
tive authority in terms of average for the years 1990-1999.
Index scores range from 0 to 7 with higher values desig-





Index on the protection of private property. Index scores







Index on the risk of expropriation of private foreign in-
vestment by the government in terms of average over the
years 1985-1995. Index scores range from 0 to 10. To
make the results more intuitive, scores have been reversed





Fraction of the population speaking one of the major






Population density in 1500. Acemoglu et al.
(2001).
23Table 1 Continued
MORTALITY Estimated mortality of European settlers in colonies be-
fore 1850. Mortality rates refer to European-born sol-
diers, sailors, and bishops when stationed in colonies. It
measures the eﬀects of local diseases on people without





International economic integration measured by cumu-
lated exports and imports as a share of real GDP per





Trade openness extracted from a gravity equation on dis-
tance, country size, and other geographical controls.
Frankel and Rose
(2002).
LATITUDE Country’s distance from the equator scaled to take values
between 0 and 1, where 0 designates the location of the
equator and 1 designates the poles.
La Porta et al.
(1999).
TROPIC Land surface located in tropical climatic zone (deﬁned
after the classiﬁcation of Koeppen and Geiger).
Gallup et al.
(1999).
MALARIA Population living in areas with malaria in 1994. Gallup et al.
(1999).
POP Population of a country WDI.
Table 2: Basic Data
High and Upper Middle Income Countries
Country Contracting Predatory Trade Credit to Stock
Institutions Institutions Openness Private market
Actual Constr. Actual Constr. Actual Constr. Sector Capital.
Argentina 5.40 4.39 5.18 6.57 0.18 0.03 0.19 0.13
Australia 1.80 2.68 7.00 6.67 0.38 0.02 0.71 0.63
Austria 3.52 4.00 7.00 7.47 0.73 0.16 0.95 0.13
Bahamas 2.84 5.98 1.11 0.12 0.57 0
Bahrain 4.40 2.74 1.73 3.31 1.64 0.38 0.57 1.05
Barbados 2.37 2.73 6.18 6.04 1.05 0.47 0.49 0.38
Belgium 2.73 4.33 7.00 6.33 1.43 0.66 0.67 0.46
Chile 4.57 4.32 7.00 6.62 0.52 0.04 0.55 0.83
Costa Rica 5.48 4.71 7.00 5.72 0.77 0.14 0.14 0.07
Czech Rep. 4.06 3.82 7.00 6.26 0.85 0.13 0.72 0.23
Denmark 2.55 3.28 7.00 6.85 0.71 0.28 0.37 0.38
Dominica 3.28 6.07 1.25 0.02 0.54
Finland 3.14 3.19 7.00 7.11 0.57 0.10 0.70 0.51
France 3.23 4.02 6.00 7.38 0.43 0.15 0.90 0.40
Gabon 4.89 2.00 3.66 1.05 0.04 0.10 0
Greece 3.99 3.57 7.00 6.01 0.43 0.11 0.34 0.28
Grenada 2.80 3.20 5.86 1.08 0.36 0.60
Hong Kong 0.73 2.55 5.46 2.42 1.36 1.53 2.07
Hungary 3.42 3.94 7.00 6.38 0.82 0.10 0.29 0.13
Iceland 4.13 3.14 7.00 7.22 0.68 0.10 0.55 0.24
Ireland 2.63 2.82 7.00 7.48 1.26 0.31 0.65 0.58
Israel 3.30 2.57 7.00 5.14 0.59 0.22 0.67 0.37
Italy 4.04 4.12 7.00 6.23 0.46 0.14 0.60 0.22
Japan 2.98 3.52 7.00 6.12 0.17 0.07 1.99 0.76
Korea (South) 3.37 3.55 6.00 6.17 0.54 0.14 0.72 0.35
Kuwait 3.88 2.79 2.80 3.14 0.99 0.32 0.47 0.63
Luxembourg 3.56 4.39 7.00 5.95 2.21 1.08 1.43
Malaysia 2.34 3.16 4.46 2.80 1.93 0.12 1.32 1.85
Malta 2.44 3.04 7.00 6.06 1.20 0.66 0.97 0.16
Mauritius 3.01 7.00 5.11 1.27 0.40 0.47 0.30
Mexico 4.71 4.74 4.55 5.80 0.38 0.04 0.24 0.30
Morocco 4.71 3.87 2.82 3.20 0.52 0.09 0.45 0.18
Netherlands 3.07 3.59 7.00 6.57 1.08 0.44 0.95 0.83
New Zealand 1.58 2.55 7.00 6.77 0.62 0.04 0.93 0.44
Norway 2.95 3.17 7.00 7.13 0.71 0.11 0.76 0.28
Oman 4.00 1.91 3.05 0.87 0.14 0.31 0.22
Panama 5.84 4.87 6.00 5.12 1.67 0.12 0.70 0.16
Poland 4.15 4.06 6.36 6.68 0.40 0.12 0.22 0.05
Portugal 3.93 4.21 7.00 7.29 0.60 0.17 0.73 0.23
Qatar 2.90 1.00 2.64 0.79 0.15 0.40 0.35
Saudi Arabia 3.80 1.00 3.38 0.78 0.03 0.55 0.34
Singapore 2.50 3.05 3.00 3.94 3.31 0.92 1.06 1.40
South Africa 1.68 2.87 7.00 4.88 0.46 0.04 1.13 1.43
Spain 5.25 4.23 7.00 6.49 0.43 0.10 0.80 0.36
St. Kitts & Nevis 2.75 6.19 1.27 0.33 0.68
St. Lucia 3.33 5.86 1.22 0.35 0.64 0
St. Vincent & Gren. 3.63 2.81 6.02 1.27 0.39 0.48
Sweden 2.98 3.18 7.00 7.08 0.65 0.07 1.09 0.71
Switzerland 3.13 4.04 7.00 6.74 0.68 0.29 1.67 1.35
Trinidad & Tobago 4.05 2.94 3.00 6.07 0.93 0.25 0.45 0.25
Turkey 2.37 5.00 0.37 0.09 0.20 0.18
Utd. Arab Emirates 2.85 3.00 2.73 1.26 0.09 0.47 0.15
United Kingdom 2.58 3.40 7.00 7.74 0.47 0.14 1.16 1.21
United States 2.62 2.70 7.00 6.56 0.20 0.02 1.09 0.94
Uruguay 4.05 4.32 7.00 6.75 0.35 0.07 0.31 0.01
Venezuela 6.01 4.95 5.82 5.34 0.37 0.05 0.18 0.12
24Low and Lower Middle Income Countries
Country Contracting Predatory Trade Credit to Stock-
Institutions Institutions Openness Private market
Actual Constr. Actual Constr. Actual Constr. Sector Capital.
Algeria 4.62 3.84 2.45 3.28 0.63 0.06 0.13 0
Angola 4.75 3.00 4.06 0.02 0.04 0
Bangladesh 3.24 3.72 4.72 3.71 0.26 0.09 0.19 0.03
Benin 4.46 4.56 5.00 3.68 0.52 0.06 0.11 0
Bhutan 4.02 2.00 4.93 0.75 0.03 0.07 0.09
Bolivia 5.75 4.94 7.00 4.72 0.43 0.02 0.47 0.03
Brazil 3.06 4.63 6.00 5.37 0.18 0.02 0.48 0.21
Bulgaria 4.57 3.66 7.00 5.59 0.79 0.13 0.11 0.03
Burkina Faso 4.64 4.38 2.00 3.24 0.47 0.02 0.10 0
Burundi 4.69 2.14 4.37 0.14 0.03 0.18 0
Cameroon 4.77 4.76 2.00 3.22 0.47 0.15 0.13 0
Canada 2.09 2.72 7.00 7.04 0.70 0.03 0.80 0.65
Cen. African Rep. 4.58 3.91 3.46 0.62 0.03 0.05 0
Chad 4.51 1.90 2.92 0.57 0.01 0.04 0
Colombia 4.11 5.07 6.36 5.04 0.39 0.06 0.33 0.13
Comoros 3.87 4.30 3.05 0.55 0.12 0.14
Congo Dem. Rep. 4.90 1.00 3.39 0.11 0.02 0.01 0
Congo Rep. 4.89 3.10 3.44 0.67 0.04 0.11 0
Djibouti 4.37 2.18 1.93 1.71 0.11 0.45
Dominican Rep. 4.08 4.67 5.46 5.78 0.41 0.09 0.26 0
Ecuador 4.92 5.14 6.91 4.59 0.65 0.08 0.22 0.09
Egypt 3.79 2.52 3.00 3.62 0.47 0.09 0.38 0.14
El Salvador 4.60 3.33 5.00 5.93 0.48 0.24 0.20 0.09
Gambia 3.14 2.82 2.09 2.16 0.10 0.11 0
Ghana 2.65 3.22 3.30 3.73 0.89 0.05 0.06 0.15
Guatemala 5.68 4.72 4.36 5.20 0.41 0.16 0.17 0.01
Guinea 4.41 2.46 2.27 0.47 0.04 0.05 0
Guinea Bissau 4.47 3.78 3.05 1.02 0.06 0.11
Guyana 3.20 4.27 4.69 0.06 0.35 0
Haiti 4.35 4.50 5.38 0.29 0.08 0.13 0
Honduras 4.90 4.61 5.00 5.93 0.96 0.16 0.30 0.08
India 3.34 2.78 7.00 4.64 0.20 0.05 0.24 0.27
Indonesia 3.90 4.45 2.82 1.99 0.79 0.04 0.48 0.20
Iran 3.99 3.36 2.93 0.50 0.04 0.28 0.14
Iraq 2.57 1.00 3.44 0.14 0.06
Ivory Coast 3.65 4.60 2.80 3.02 0.68 0.04 0.23 0.07
Jamaica 2.34 2.87 7.00 5.84 1.12 0.13 0.29 0.33
Jordan 3.52 3.97 3.00 3.06 1.34 0.23 0.72 0.66
Kenya 3.09 3.47 3.00 3.36 0.56 0.03 0.33 0.16
Laos 4.10 3.00 4.65 0.44 0.06 0.08
Madagascar 4.32 4.31 5.90 4.07 0.78 0.06 0.13 0
Malawi 2.95 3.17 3.55 3.83 0.62 0.06 0.09 0.02
Mali 4.72 4.22 4.60 2.48 0.53 0.02 0.13 0
Mauritania 4.13 3.00 2.51 1.01 0.03 0.31 0
Mongolia 3.60 6.64 5.95 1.37 0.03 0.12 0.04
Mozambique 4.49 4.41 3.64 3.85 0.42 0.02 0.14 0
Myanmar 2.82 3.00 4.77 0.10 0.08
Nepal 4.19 4.04 6.00 4.79 0.50 0.07 0.20 0.05
Nicaragua 4.96 4.72 6.09 5.22 0.54 0.13 0.47 0
Niger 4.32 4.21 4.40 2.52 0.43 0.01 0.07 0
Nigeria 3.19 3.25 1.80 2.96 0.45 0.04 0.11 0.07
Pakistan 3.76 2.81 5.73 2.82 0.31 0.14 0.27 0.15
Papua New Guinea 3.10 7.00 4.53 0.94 0.04 0.19 0
Paraguay 5.91 4.50 6.18 5.40 0.83 0.03 0.24 0.03
Peru 5.60 4.99 3.70 4.76 0.30 0.05 0.18 0.15
Philippines 5.00 4.64 6.18 4.75 1.01 0.11 0.40 0.53
Romania 4.42 3.60 5.46 6.14 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.01
Rwanda 4.72 1.70 4.26 0.63 0.03 0.08 0
Senegal 4.72 4.31 3.27 2.31 0.75 0.05 0.21 0
Sierra Leone 3.20 2.14 2.58 0.27 0.06 0.02 0
Somalia 3.16 1.00 1.81 0.04 0.03
Sri Lanka 3.78 3.01 5.00 4.21 0.76 0.18 0.21 0.15
Sudan 3.07 1.00 2.72 0.17 0.03 0.03 0
Suriname 5.08 6.36 3.76 1.09 0.05 0.22 0
Syria 3.87 1.18 3.52 0.68 0.11 0.10 0
Tanzania 3.82 3.43 3.00 3.09 0.48 0.03 0.08 0
Thailand 3.14 4.22 6.27 4.30 0.98 0.12 1.25 0.52
Togo 4.54 1.89 3.67 0.75 0.07 0.21
Tunisia 2.53 3.49 7.00 4.10 0.93 0.15 0.66 0.11
Uganda 2.61 3.71 2.46 3.17 0.33 0.02 0.04 0
Zambia 2.13 3.20 4.64 4.18 0.58 0.03 0.08 0.04
Zimbabwe 3.11 2.81 3.00 5.01 0.59 0.05 0.31 0.25
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Table 3: First Stage: Institutional Quality Variables
Dependent Variable Legal For-
malism
Constraints on Executive
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Common Law -0.56***
(0.08)






Muslim -0.38*** -0.35*** -0.23**
(0.07) (0.09) (0.10)
Ethnic 0.15 -0.18** -0.19* -0.17
(0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10)
Latitude -0.25*** 0.33*** 0.20* 0.17*
(0.09) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10)
Adj R
2 0.46 0.53 0.42 0.47
F-Statistic 21.96 37.75 15.51 14.74
Obs. 103 129 82 80
Notes: All regressions are cross-sectional. Estimation is by OLS. Table
1 contains deﬁnitions and sources of all variables. Standard errors are in
parentheses. They are heteroscedasticity robust by the method of White.
Coeﬃcients pertain to standardised variables (beta coeﬃcients) and are
signiﬁcant at the 10% level when labelled with *, at the 5% level when
labelled with **, and at the 1% level when labelled with ***.
26Table 4: Determinants of Financial Development
Dependent Variable Stock Market Capitalisation Credit to Private Sector
Estimation Method OLS 2SLS Tobit OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Legal Formalism -0.29*** -0.07 -0.08 -0.29*** 0.01
(0.11) (0.15) (0.12) (0.09) (0.10)
Constraints on Executive 0.19** 0.25* 0.25* 0.41*** 0.63***
(0.09) (0.14) (0.14) (0.08) (0.14)
Trade Openness 0.39*** 0.40*** 0.48*** 0.25*** 0.35***
(0.13) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.06)
Protestant 0.06 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.12)
Catholic -0.02 -0.26** -0.26** 0.02 -0.18
(0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.16)
Muslim 0.06 -0.02 -0.02 0.09 0.23*
(0.10) (0.12) (0.11) (0.08) (0.12)
Adj R
2 0.29 0.38 - 0.32 0.39
Obs. 99 112 112 103 122
χ
2 41.85 179.2
Notes: All regressions are cross-sectional. Table 1 contains deﬁnitions and sources of all
variables. In columns (2), (3) and (5) Legal Formalism, Constraints on the Executive,
and Trade Openness have been instrumented for by the corresponding proxies of table
2. Standard errors are in parentheses. They are heteroscedasticity robust, applying the
method of White. Coeﬃcients pertain to standardised variables (beta coeﬃcients) and are
signiﬁcant at the 10% level when labelled with *, at the 5% level when labelled with **,
and at the 1% level when labelled with ***.
Table 5: Robustness Checks I: Alternative Instruments
Dep. Variable Stock Market Capitalisation








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Legal Formalism 0.03 -0.08 -0.24* -0.15 -0.04 -0.18 -0.04 -0.02
(0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.17) (0.13)
Constr. Execut. 0.43*** 0.37*** 0.35*** 0.29*** 0.21 0.30** 0.11 0.01
(0.12) (0.12) (0.16) (0.10) (0.14) (0.15) (0.21) (0.31)
Trade Openness 0.38*** 0.41*** 0.19** 0.49*** 0.48*** 0.25 0.43* 0.38**
(0.12) (0.10) (0.09) (0.07) (0.14) (0.16) (0.23) (0.15)
Protestant -0.12 -0.23** 0.14 0.11 0.03 -0.11 -0.15 -0.20
(0.14) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.15) (0.13)
Catholic -0.48*** -0.38** -0.05 -0.13 -0.26** -0.24 -0.15 -0.53***
(0.15) (0.15) (0.13) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) (0.23) (0.18)
Muslim -0.15 -0.15 0.11 0.08 -0.02 -0.05 -0.26 -0.20
(0.14) (0.12) (0.13) (0.09) (0.12) (0.15) (0.26) (0.25)
Loglikelihood -74.21 -81.61 -133.1 -121.5 -136.7 -141.1 -80.63 -57.43
Obs. 70 75 107 111 116 112 62 49
Dep. Variable Credit to Private Sector








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Legal Formalism 0.12 -0.20* -0.01 0.06 0.09 -0.06 0.22 -0.03
(0.13) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.17) (0.17)
Constr. Execut. 0.67*** 0.43*** 0.67*** 0.71*** 0.57*** 0.67*** 0.21 0.37
(0.12) (0.12) (0.15) (0.14) (0.16) (0.14) (0.22) (0.26)
Trade Openness 0.38** 0.43*** 0.22** 0.31*** 0.36*** 0.18* 0.34* 0.24*
(0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.10) (0.19) (0.13)
Protestant -0.09 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.04 -0.05 -0.01 -0.25
(0.14) (0.08) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.25)
Catholic -0.28 0.07 -0.24 -0.33* -0.30* -0.17 -0.11 -0.52*
(0.19) (0.09) (0.20) (0.19) (0.16) (0.16) (0.27) (0.30)
Muslim 0.22 0.23** 0.23* 0.23** 0.17 0.21 0.20 0.12
(0.18) (0.10) (0.13) (0.11) (0.12) (0.14) (0.38) (0.23)
Adj R
2 0.48 0.49 0.36 0.42 0.33 0.31 0.11 0.20
Obs. 76 86 111 115 126 122 68 53
Notes: All regressions are cross-sectional. Table 1 contains deﬁnitions and sources of all variables.
Estimation is by 2SLS. Estimates of the top panel account for the censored nature of STOCK. Standard
errors are in parentheses. They are heteroscedasticity robust by the method of White. Coeﬃcients
pertain to standardised variables (beta coeﬃcients) and are signiﬁcant at the 10% level when labelled
with *, at the 5% level when labelled with **, and at the 1% level when labelled with ***.
27Table 6: Robustness Checks II: Alternative Institutional Quality Variables
Dep. Variable Stock Market Capitalisation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Procedural Compl. -0.11 -0.10
(0.12) (0.13)
Nr. of Procedures -0.02 -0.06
(0.15) (0.15)
Risk of Expropri. -0.16 -0.15
(0.10) (0.17)
Private Prop. Rights 0.18 0.17
(0.17) (0.10)
Trade Openness 0.48*** 0.50*** 0.48*** 0.49***
(0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Protestant -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.004
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Catholic -0.20* -0.28*** -0.22* -0.26**
(0.11) (0.10) (0.12) (0.10)
Muslim -0.11 -0.14 -0.14 -0.11
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Log Likelihood -130.1 -130.0 -129.7 -130.4
Obs. 112 112 112 112
Dep. Variable Credit to Private Sector
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Procedural Compl. -0.05 -0.02
(0.11) (0.11)
Nr. of Procedures 0.02 -0.04
(0.13) (0.13)
Risk of Expropri. -0.42*** -0.40**
(0.10) (0.14)
Private Prop. Rights 0.44*** 0.43***
(0.14) (0.10)
Trade Openness 0.36*** 0.37*** 0.36*** 0.36***
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
Protestant 0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.03
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Catholic -0.07 -0.14 -0.13 -0.09
(0.15) (0.13) (0.16) (0.13)
Muslim -0.01 0.06 -0.06 0.004
(0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Adj R
2 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.37
Obs. 122 122 122 122
Notes: All regressions are cross-sectional. Table 1 contains deﬁnitions and sources
of all variables. Estimation is by 2SLS. Estimates of the top panel account for
the censored nature of STOCK. Standard errors are in parentheses. They are
heteroscedasticity robust by the method of White. Coeﬃcients pertain to stan-
dardised variables (beta coeﬃcients) and are signiﬁcant at the 10% level when
labelled with *, at the 5% level when labelled with **, and at the 1% level when
labelled with ***.
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